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A PREFERRED APPROACH: HOW MINORITY-
OWNED BUSINESSES CAN COMBAT UNION 
DISCRIMINATION 
 
EDWARD FRISCHLING

 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Minority-owned businesses have historically been unsuccessful in 
obtaining relief against labor unions allegedly engaged in discriminatory 
treatment based on the minority status of the business owner. For example, 
in Trustees of the Painters Union Deposit Fund v. Interior/Exterior 
Specialist Company,
1
 an Hispanic-owned company sued a labor union 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 of the Civil Rights Act for allegedly ordering 
audits of the company’s books and records while not doing the same for 
similarly-situated, “white–owned” companies. In that case, the company 
was a painting contractor, solely owned by a Hispanic man. After five 
years of operation, the company’s employees complained to the union that 
they were not receiving certain fringe benefit contributions from the 
company.
2
 Subsequently, the union requested a comprehensive audit of the 
company. In response, the company filed a claim alleging that the union’s 
ordering of comprehensive audits constituted discrimination under Section 
1981 because the Union had not ordered audits of non-Hispanic-owned 
companies with similar business practices.
3
 Among other evidence, the 
Hispanic owner obtained the testimony of various individuals, including 
the owner of another painting company who testified that, after he began to 
hire numerous Hispanic workers, he received a barrage of prevailing wage 
complaints from the Union.
4
 On these facts, the Sixth Circuit considered 
whether the Union applied its contractual right under the applicable 
collective bargaining agreement to issue comprehensive audits in a 
discriminatory manner. This article will examine the viability of the causes 
of action available to plaintiff minority-owned businesses who believe 
labor unions have discriminated against them, like the plaintiff in Painters 
Union. 
Minority-owned businesses that believe labor unions have 
discriminated against them have two viable causes of action. The first (and 
                                                          

 Columbia University Law School, J.D. 2011. Labor & Employment Associate in 
the New York office of Holland & Knight LLP. I would like to thank Professor Rodger 
Citron and Robert Valletti for their tremendous insights on the substance of this article. 
I would also thank Sandra and Allison Frischling for their support during the writing 
process. 
1
 371 Fed. Appx. 654 (6th Cir. 2010). 
2
 Id. at 656. 
3
 See id. at 657. 
4
 See id. at 658 (testifying that the Union had seldom contacted him during the first 
ten years of his business). 
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more likely to succeed) cause of action is bringing a claim against a union 
for discriminatory application of contractual provisions in the applicable 
collective bargaining agreement. The second cause of action available to 
minority-owned businesses is filing a claim against a union under the 
theory that the union’s discriminatory conduct interferes with the 
business’s ability to obtain and maintain commercial contracts. This is also 
known as “discriminatory interference with third-party contracts.” This 
article not only provides a short background of the history of 42 U.S.C. § 
1981, but it will also describe the recent case law under both causes of 
action available to minority-owned businesses.  
The article concludes with an analysis of the viability of both theories, 
which shows that a minority-owned business is more likely to succeed on a 
claim that the contractual provisions of a collective bargaining agreement 
are being applied in a discriminatory manner than on a claim that a labor 
union’s conduct is discriminatorily interfering with the minority owned 
businesses contracts. Both causes of action, however, may be viable to 
provide relief to minority-owned businesses that are aggrieved by the 
discriminatory conduct of labor unions. 
 
II.  BACKGROUND: SECTION 1981 
 
A.  Provisions of Section 1981 
 
42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides as follows: 
 
(a) Statement of equal rights 
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall 
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and 
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the 
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security 
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall 
be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, 
and exactions of every kind, and to no other. 
 
(b) “Make and enforce contracts” defined 
For purposes of this section, the term “make and enforce 
contracts” includes the making, performance, modification, and 
termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, 
privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship. 
 
(c) Protection against impairment 
The rights protected by this section are protected against 
impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment 
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under color of State law.
5
 
 
Generally, to establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a plaintiff must 
show that: (1) he is a member of a racial minority; (2) the defendant 
intended to discriminate against the plaintiff on the basis of race; and (3) 
the plaintiff was subjected to discrimination concerning one or more of the 
activities enumerated in Section 1981.
6
 One of the activities protected by 
Section 1981 is contracting. The statute prohibits intentional race 
discrimination affecting “the making, performance, modification, and 
termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms 
and conditions of the contractual relationship.”7    
Litigation involving 42 U.S.C. § 1981 most commonly involves the 
right to make and to enforce employment contracts.
8
 In non-employment 
litigation, under Section 1981, claims have been pursued predominantly for 
conduct that prevented the formation of the contract, as opposed to conduct 
that affected the nature and quality of the contractual relationship.
9
 At issue 
in many of the cases examined in this section are the types of conduct that 
affect minority-owned business’ enjoyment of the benefits, privileges, 
terms, conditions, nature, and quality of the contractual relationship. 
Specifically, the article will analyze this possible cause of action as it 
applies to labor unions enforcing the terms of their collective bargaining 
agreements in a discriminatory manner. 
42 U.S.C. § 1981 also offers relief when racial discrimination blocks 
the creation of contractual relationships.
10
 A plaintiff asserting a claim 
under Section 1981 must, initially, identify an impaired contractual 
relationship under which the plaintiff has rights.
11
 Such a contractual 
relationship need not already exist because Section 1981 protects the 
would-be contracting party along with those who have already made 
contracts.
12
 Defendants are liable under Section 1981 when, for racially 
motivated reasons, they prevent individuals who “[seek] to enter into 
contractual relationships” from doing so.13 42 U.S.C. § 1981 not only 
                                                          
5
 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1991). 
6
 See, e.g., Lauture v. Int'l Bus. Machines, 216 F.3d 258, 261 (2d Cir. 2000) (raising 
the issue of whether an at-will employee could sue for racially-discriminatory 
discharge under Section 1981). 
7
 42 U.S.C. §1981(b). 
8
 See, e.g., Morris v. Office Max, Inc., 89 F.3d 411, 413 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing 
Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298 (1998)). 
9
 See id.; see also Bobbitt v. Rage Inc., 19 F. Supp. 2d 512 (W.D. North Cal. 1998) 
(claiming the poor service they received at a franchised pizza restaurant was motivated 
by racially discriminatory animus). 
10
 See, e.g., Domino's Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 476 (2006) 
(determining whether a plaintiff who lacks any rights under an existing contractual 
relationship may bring suit under Section 1981).   
11
 Id.   
12
 Id. 
13
 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
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protects against the actions of contracting parties but also protects against 
the actions of third parties.
14
 Tortious interference with third-party contract 
rights violates Section 1981 when the interference is racially motivated.
15
 
This cause of action has been recognized in the Second, Fourth, Seventh, 
and Tenth Circuits.
16
 These courts have all held that defendants are liable 
under Section 1981 for interference with third-party contracts only when 
the defendant actually has the power or authority to prevent plaintiffs from 
contracting with a third party.
17
 In these circumstances, courts require a 
demonstration “that the defendant both possessed: (1) sufficient authority 
to significantly interfere with the individual's ability to obtain contracts 
with third parties and (2) that the party actually exercised that authority to 
the individuals’ detriment.”18 Additionally, a party must allege and identify 
particular and specific business opportunities that were lost due to 
discriminatory interference by a third-party before a claim for third-party 
interference can be stated.
19
 The cases examined in this article, under this 
cause of action, will viewed through the lens of discriminatory conduct of 
labor unions.   
 
B. History and Intent of Section 1981 
 
During the Reconstruction Era, and pursuant to the Thirteenth 
Amendment, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which 
provided the guarantees now codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
20
 Congress 
intended for the Civil Rights Act to counter discrimination faced by the 
recently freed slaves.
21
 After the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
                                                          
14
 See Ginx, Inc. v. Soho Alliance, 720 F. Supp. 2d 342 (S.D.N.Y 2010) (citing 
Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62, 75 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
15
 See, e.g., Muhammad v. Oliver, 547 F.3d 874, 878 (7th Cir 2008). 
16
 See supra footnotes 18, 19, 43, 134, 150 and accompanying text. 
17
 Ginx,720 F. Supp. 2d at 357. 
18
 Harris v. Allstate Ins. Co., 300 F.3d 1183, 1197 (10th Cir. 2002). 
19
 See Ginx, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 357; see also Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 
1262, 1267 – 68 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that vague and conclusory allegations of lost 
business opportunities are insufficient to state a claim under §1981); Morris v. Office 
Max, Inc., 89 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a claim under Section 1981 had to 
allege an actual loss of contract interest, not merely the possible loss of future contract 
opportunities). 
20
 Note that the original language of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 did not contain the 
phrase “all persons” but rather “citizens, of every race and color.” 
21
 See Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982) (“Congress 
instead acted to protect the freedmen from intentional discrimination by those whose 
object was to make their former slaves dependent serfs, victims of unjust laws, and 
debarred from all progress and elevation by organized social prejudices.”) (internal 
citations omitted); Doe v. Kamehameha Sch./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 470 F.3d 
827, 835 (9th Cir. 2006).   
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Congress reenacted the text of the 1866 Act in the Enforcement Act of 
1870.
22
   
After Congress passed the Enforcement Act, 42 U.S.C § 1981 
“underwent nearly a century of desuetude during which debate regarding 
its scope and meaning was generally subsumed by the controversy 
surrounding the newly ratified Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection 
Clause.”23 The statute did not gain traction as a tool in remedial litigation 
because there was “lingering uncertainty regarding the scope of the statute 
and the extent of Congress's authority to prohibit discrimination divorced 
from state action.”24 Subsequently, the Supreme Court reinvigorated the 
statute from its prior existence “as a device to augment the remedies for 
previously recognized forms of discrimination, to a litigation tool in its 
own right with unparalleled theoretical coverage.”25  
In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., the Supreme Court interpreted a 
companion statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, to encompass and to prohibit racial 
discrimination in purely private transactions.
26
 The Jones Court held that 
the right to “inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and 
personal property” is secured against interference from both governmental 
and private actions.
27
   
In Runyon v. McCrary, the Court explicitly came to the same result 
under Section 1981. The issue in Runyon was whether Section 1981 
prevents “private, commercially operated, nonsectarian schools from 
denying admission to prospective students because they are Negroes.”28 
The plaintiffs, parents of African American children, had sought to enter 
into contractual relationships with the schools. “Under those contractual 
relationships, the schools would have received payments for services 
rendered, and the prospective students would have received instruction in 
return for those payments.”29 The Court held that the schools' refusal to 
admit them “amount[ed] to a classic violation of § 1981.”30 The Court 
emphasized that Congress had the right to reach private acts of 
discrimination in the private school setting because of its power under the 
Thirteenth Amendment to enact legislation to combat racial 
                                                          
22
 Kamehameha Sch.., 470 F.3d at 835.  
23
 Doe v. Kamehameha Sch./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 416 F.3d 1025, 1032 (9th 
Cir. 2005), rev'd in part on reconsideration, 470 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 2006). 
24
 Id. (declaring that “governmental action” was required in a suit based on the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866). 
25
 Id.; see Runyon v. McCreary, 427 U.S. 160, 170 (1976); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, 
Co., 392 U.S. 409, 423 (1968).   
26
 Jones, 392 U.S. at 423-24. 
27
 Id. (“[W]hen Congress provided in § 1 of the Civil Rights Act that the right to 
purchase and lease property was to be enjoyed equally throughout the United States by 
Negro and white citizens alike, it plainly meant to secure that right against interference 
from any source whatever, whether governmental or private.”). 
28
 Runyon, 427 U.S. at 160. 
29
 Id. at 172.   
30
 Id. 
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discrimination.
31
 Runyon, then, involved a straightforward case of 
discrimination, not a remedial policy. Accordingly, Jones and Runyon 
finally dispensed with the state action requirement and held that the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 reached purely private acts of discrimination by virtue 
of Congress' power under section two of the Thirteenth Amendment.
32
   
In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
33
 the Supreme Court indicated 
that the analysis under Title VII should be the same as Section 1981 claims 
brought against private employers.
34
 In Patterson, the plaintiff brought a 
Section 1981 suit against her former employer alleging that the employer 
harassed her, failed to promote her, and fired her on account of her race.
35
 
The Court discussed the similarities and differences between Section 1981 
and Title VII and held that the Title VII burden-shifting system of proof, 
established in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine
36
 and 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
37
 applied to the instant case.
38
  Under 
the burden shifting system, the plaintiff first must establish a prima facie 
case of discrimination by coming forward with evidence that an employer 
considered race in its employment decisions.
39
 After a prima facie case is 
established, the burden then shifts to the employer to provide a legitimate, 
non-discriminatory reason for the decision.
40
 If a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason exists, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to 
show that the justification provided was pretextual and that the plan is 
invalid.
41
 Since Patterson, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 has become a powerful 
weapon in the fight to eradicate discrimination. 
 
C.  Application of Current Case Law in Suits Brought by  
 Minority-Owned Businesses 
 
Both causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are applicable to a wide 
range of union conduct. Examples of union conduct could include, but 
would not be limited to, a union’s enforcement of wage policies, 
distribution of letters of good standing, issuance of audits, and any other 
contractual requirements under a collective bargaining agreement. In 
                                                          
31
 Id. at 170-71. 
32
 Doe v. Kamehameha Sch./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 416 F.3d 1025, 1033 (9th 
Cir. 2005), rev'd in part on reconsideration, 470 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 2006).   
33
 491 U.S. 164, 186 (1989), superseded by statute on other grounds. 
34
 See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. 
35
 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 169 (1989).     
36
 450 U.S. 248, 252–53 (1981). 
37
 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
38
 Patterson, 491 U.S. at 186. 
39
 Id.; see also Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 626 (1987). 
40
 Patterson, 491 U.S. at 187.    
41
 Id. 
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theory, both causes of action would intersect and be used in conjunction 
with each other to remedy this type of discriminatory union behavior. 
Although no case law currently exists (in the context a minority business 
owner suing a union) in which the lawyers have argued under both 
theories,
42
 one could imagine circumstances where both causes of action 
could be used.    
This article will use the following hypothetical as a vehicle for the 
purposes of analysis. A union discriminatorily refuses to supply a letter of 
good standing to a shipping company because its owner is African 
American (assume the company needs a letter of good standing to be hired 
by third parties). Under the first cause of action, the shipping company 
would have relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, if it could prove that the union 
refused to supply the letter because of racial animus. The owner of the 
shipping company would have relief under the second cause of action if it 
proved that that the union’s discriminatory refusal to supply the letter 
interfered with its ability to make contracts with third parties. This 
hypothetical will be explored further in Part IV of this article. 
 
III. RECENT CASE LAW 
 
A.  Challenges to Contractual Provisions 
 
At issue in the cases examined in this section of the article is conduct 
that affects the enjoyment of the benefits, privileges, terms, conditions, 
nature, and quality of the contractual relationship. 
In Trustees of the Painters Union Deposit Fund v. Interior/Exterior 
Specialist Company, the trustees of a union fund brought an action seeking 
fringe benefits against a union-painting contractor and a non-union painting 
contractor.
43
 The contractors impleaded the union, alleging discrimination 
and defamation claims and sought restitution for overpayment of the fringe 
benefits.
44Interior/Exterior Specialist Company (“IES”) was a Hispanic-
owned, union painting contractor with Mr. Llamas as its sole shareholder, 
officer, and director.  The Llamas Group (“TLG”) was a non-union, 
painting contractor founded in 1999 by Mr. Llamas’ wife as the sole 
shareholder, officer, and director.
45
 In 1998, IES and Painters District 
council No. 22 of the International Brotherhood of Painters and Allied 
Trades (“The Union”) concluded a collective bargaining agreement 
(“CBA”) that required IES to pay a set fringe benefit amount to the Painters 
Union Deposit Fund (“The Fund”) for every hour that IES painters worked. 
                                                          
42
 In Daniels v. Pipefitters' Ass'n Local Union No. 597, 45 F.2d 906 (7th Cir.1991), an 
individual member of the union sued under both theories. 
43
 Trustees of Painters Union Deposit Fund v. Interior/Exterior Specialist Co., 371 Fed. 
Appx. 654 (6th Cir. 2010). 
44
 Id. at 654. 
45
 Id. at 656. 
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In 2003, IES employees complained that they were not receiving fringe 
benefit contributions, and the Union requested a comprehensive audit of 
IES.
46
 Additionally, in 2003, the Union filed a National Labor Relations 
Board charge against IES and TLG. The Union alleged that for six months 
IES and TLG had worked as an illegal, double-breasted operation and 
failed to pay CBA required wages and fringe benefits.
47
 In February 2004, 
the Fund sued IES for alleged collective bargaining violations and for 
failure to pay fringe benefits. Additionally, they sought a court mandated, 
comprehensive audit of IES’s books and records to determine the amount 
owed.
48
 IES filed a counterclaim alleging that the Union’s ordering of 
comprehensive audits constituted discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §1981 
because the Union had not ordered audits of non-Hispanic owned 
companies with similar business practices.
49
  
Mr. Llamas supported his discrimination claim with the testimony of 
various individuals, including other contractors. In support of Mr. Llamas 
claims, Mr. Balatzis, an owner of a non-union painting company, testified 
that the Union seldom contacted him during his first ten years in business. 
After he hired Hispanic workers, however, contact from the union 
increased, and he received a “barrage of prevailing wage complaints.”50 
Additionally, Robert Kennedy, the union manager, testified that Mr. 
Llamas had previously notified the Union that other union-painting 
contractors had related non-union companies, which Mr. Llamas alleged 
gave them a competitive advantage over IES. Furthermore, other union-
contractors testified that they owned related non-union companies, but the 
Union had not ordered comprehensive audits of their companies.
51
 These 
other contractors also testified that, to their knowledge, union employees 
had not complained about their payment practices.
52
 
The district court found that IES’s 42 U.S.C. §1981 claim was 
insufficient because the Union would have ordered comprehensive audits 
of IES, regardless of IES’ Hispanic ownership, due to employee complaints 
about IES’s failure to pay fringe benefits.53 The district court also 
concluded that the Union had not ordered comprehensive audits of other 
firms because their employees did not complain about their wages and 
                                                          
46
 Id. 
47
 A double-breasted operation is a condition where an employer operates two closely 
related companies—one with a union contract and one without. Under such operation, 
the employer will normally assign most of the work to the non-union segment of his 
two companies. 
48
 Trustees of Painters Union Deposit Fund, 371 Fed. Appx. at 656. 
49
 Id. 
50
 Id. at 658. 
51
 Id. 
52
 Id. 
53
 Id. 
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noted that the Union does not aggressively enforce the CBA without 
employee complaints. The Sixth Circuit affirmed and held that the Union 
did not violate 42 U.S.C. § 1981 when it ordered comprehensive audits of 
IES but not of non-Hispanic union contractors with closely related non-
union companies. The court reasoned that the Union did not order 
comprehensive audits of other entities allegedly engaged in double 
breasting because it received no employee complaints about those 
entities.
54
   
In Carpenters Health and Welfare Fund of Philadelphia v. KIA 
Enterprises,
55
 the plaintiffs, Carpenters Health and Welfare Fund (“The 
Union”), sued Kia Enterprises (“Kia”) to collect payments allegedly owed 
to them under a collective bargaining agreement and related trust 
agreements (collectively the “CBA”).56 Kia, an African-American owned 
business, filed a counterclaim, alleging that in seeking to collect the 
payments allegedly owed by Kia, the Union violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 
Kia claimed that the Union, in pursuing their claim under the CBA, 
“acted in furtherance of and pursuant to their long-standing pattern and 
practice of discriminating and retaliating against Minority Business 
enterprises and minority members of the carpenters union; particularly 
African American business and union members.”57 The counterclaim 
alleged numerous, specific discriminatory actions by the Union. First, it 
alleged that the Union submitted a formal demand for payment to Liberty 
Mutual Insurance Company as the first step in submitting an 
unsubstantiated claim against Kia's performance bond.
58
 Second, the 
counterclaim alleged that the plaintiffs pressured the School Reform 
Commission of the City of Philadelphia (“SRC”) to refuse to make timely 
payments for money owed to Kia.
59
 Third, it alleged that the plaintiffs did 
not similarly pressure the SRC with respect to non-minority-owned 
businesses that owe the plaintiffs money.
60
 Fourth, the counterclaim alleged 
that the plaintiffs discriminated against Kia by auditing Kia's books and 
records, including those that had no relation to work covered by the CBA.
61
 
Finally, Kia claimed that the plaintiffs made similar unjustified demands of 
another minority-owned company but did not make similar demands of 
non-minority-owned businesses.
62
 
The court held that Kia failed to sufficiently plead specific facts to 
                                                          
54
 Id. 
55
 Civ. No. 09-116, 2009 WL 2152276, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 15, 2009). 
56
 Kia Enterprises, Civ. No. 09-116, at *1. 
57
 Id. 
58
 Id. 
59
 Id. 
60
 Id. 
61
 Id. at *2, *3 (finding Kia attempted “to ‘nidge’ its allegations of discrimination 
across the ‘line from conceivable to plausible’ . . . . [H]owever, [it] offers no specific 
facts in support . . . .”). 
62
 Id. at *1. 
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support its counterclaim that the pension funds disparately treated minority 
and non-minority businesses in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
63
 The court 
acknowledged that the plaintiffs began the process of making a claim 
against Kia's performance bond, sought to persuade a city agency to 
withhold payments to Kia, and demanded to audit Kia's books and records; 
however, it noted that these actions were entirely consistent with a lawful 
attempt by the plaintiffs to collect unpaid CBA obligations that they were 
owed. Citing the Iqbal standard for pleadings, the court reasoned that Kia’s 
allegations alone were not sufficient to suggest actionable wrongdoing.
64
 
Additionally, Kia's allegation that the plaintiffs took similar steps against 
other minority-owned businesses was also entirely consistent with lawful 
actions by the plaintiffs to collect unpaid CBA payments.
65
 The court 
emphasized that Kia did not plead sufficient, additional facts to push its 
allegations of discrimination across the “line from conceivable to 
plausible.”66 Indeed, the court was not persuaded because Kia failed to 
identify particular instances of disparate treatment. Thus, the court held that 
the allegations were merely “legal conclusions couched as factual 
allegations,” and in order to prevail, Kia would need to plead its allegations 
with more specificity.
67
 
 
B. Comparator Cases and Their Applicability to Employer-Union 
Discrimination Cases 
 
The logic employed in the above cases is similar to cases in the 
employment context in which violations of legitimate employer 
expectations are met with disparate treatment based on race.
68
 For example, 
in Curry v. Menard, an African-American cashier violated the store's 
progressive disciplinary policy.
69
 The policy provided that each cashier’s 
register would be counted at the end of the day.
70
 The amount counted 
would then be compared to a master computer printout.
71
 The first time a 
cashier's register count deviated from the printout by three dollars or more, 
the cashier would receive a written warning.
72
 If this happened two more 
times, it would result in the termination of the cashier.
73
 The plaintiff in 
                                                          
63
 Id. 
64
 Id. at *2. 
65
 Id. 
66
 Id. at *3. 
67
 Id. (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 29 S. Ct. 1937 (2009)). 
68
 Curry v. Menard, Inc., 270 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 2001). 
69
 Id. at 475. 
70
 Id. 
71
 Id. 
72
 Id. 
73
 Id. at 476. 
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Curry admitted that she violated the progressive disciplinary policy by 
being overdrawn and should have been terminated.
74
 She maintained, 
however, that two, non-African-American cashiers with similar violations 
were not terminated.
75
 From January 1, 1997 to December 31, 1998, the 
plaintiff was the only cashier terminated for violating the store's 
progressive discipline policy; but, if the employer strictly enforced its own 
policy, sixteen other cashiers should have been terminated in that same 
time period.
76
 The issue before the court was whether the employer applied 
its legitimate employment expectations in a discriminatory manner. The 
court held that there was sufficient evidence of discrimination for the 
plaintiff to survive summary judgment. 
Other analogous factual scenarios to unions discriminatorily applying 
the terms of collective bargaining agreements involve franchisors applying 
the terms of their standard franchise agreement in a discriminatory 
manner.
77
 In Elkhatib v. Dunkin Donuts, Inc., the Seventh Circuit applied 
the McDonnell Douglas
78
 framework to a case in which a franchisor 
applied a contractual provision of the franchise agreement in a racially 
discriminatory manner.
79
 In Elkhatib, the plaintiff was an Arab franchisee 
who refused to handle pork products (specifically the ham and bacon in 
Dunkin Donuts' breakfast sandwiches) despite entering into a franchise 
agreement that required all franchisors to carry Dunkin Donuts’ full 
breakfast line.
80
 The plaintiff claimed that the handling of these products 
was forbidden to members of the Arab race by tradition and custom.
81
 For 
over twenty years, the plaintiff owned multiple franchises. During that 
entire time, Dunkin Donuts did not require him to serve pork products.
82
 In 
2002, the plaintiff wanted to relocate one of his stores and renew his 
franchise agreement.
83
 Dunkin Donuts did not allow the plaintiff to relocate 
his store or renew his franchise agreement, however, because of his failure 
                                                          
74
 Id. 
75
 Id. 
76
 Id. 
77
 See supra Section III(C)(1) (analyzing further Curry v. Menard in the context of 
unions). 
78
 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In McDonnell Douglas, 
the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff could make out a prima facie claim of racial 
discrimination by showing “(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied 
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, 
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to carry Dunkin Donuts' full breakfast sandwich product line.
84
 Based on 
Dunkin Donuts' conduct, the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff 
established a prima facie case of racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 
1981 because Dunkin Donuts applied the franchise provision in a racially 
discriminatory manner.
85
   
The plaintiff established his case by showing that Dunkin Donuts 
allowed similarly-situated franchisees to carry less than the full product 
line without consequences.
86
 Dunkin Donuts explained that the reasons the 
other franchisees did not carry the breakfast products were because of lease 
issues, space issues, and customer preferences.
87
 They noted that one of 
those franchises did not carry breakfast sandwiches because its lease 
prohibited it from serving sandwiches; another did not carry any breakfast 
sandwiches because it lacked space for the toaster oven; and the third did 
not carry any pork products because it sought to meet the demand in the 
area for a kosher establishment.
88
 
The court emphasized that the franchises identified as comparators 
were identical in all relevant respects in that they all failed to carry part or 
all of the breakfast line of products despite the requirement in their 
franchise agreement that they do so.
89
 Accordingly, the court did not accept 
Dunkin Donuts’ explanation.90 It concluded that the franchise provision 
was absolute in its terms and did not indicate that exceptions would be 
made for any reason.
91
 The court held that there was no meaningful 
distinction, for the purposes of the “similarly situated” inquiry, between 
franchisees that refused to carry breakfast sandwiches because of lease and 
space issues and the plaintiff.
92
 The court further articulated that the 
similarly-situated requirement should not be applied mechanically or 
inflexibly; rather, it is a flexible, common-sense inquiry that seeks to 
determine whether there are enough common features between the 
individuals to allow a meaningful comparison.
93
 The Seventh Circuit 
cautioned against an overly technical or rigid interpretations of this 
requirement when it stated: 
 
It is important not to lose sight of the common-sense aspect 
of this inquiry. It is not an unyielding, inflexible requirement 
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that requires near one-to-one mapping between employees-
distinctions can always be found in particular job duties or 
performance histories or the nature of the alleged transactions . 
. . but the fundamental issue remains whether such distinctions 
are so significant that they render the comparison effectively 
useless. In other words, the inquiry simply asks whether there 
are sufficient commonalities on the key variables between the 
plaintiff and the would-be comparator to allow the type of 
comparison that, taken together with the other prima facie 
evidence, would allow a jury to reach an inference of 
discrimination or retaliation-recall that the plaintiff need not 
prove anything at this stage.
94
 
 
Thus, the court held that Elkhatib's claim should survive summary 
judgment because there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find 
pretext.
95
 
To guide other courts facing similar cases, the Elkhatib court held that 
in these circumstances, the plaintiff (a minority business owner) can 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination by producing evidence that: 
(1) he belonged to a protected class; (2) he met the franchisor's legitimate 
expectations with regard to the franchise agreement; (3) he suffered an 
adverse action; and 4) similarly-situated non-protected individuals were 
treated more favorably.
96
 Once the plaintiff meets that burden, the 
traditional McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting process would 
commence.
97
 
 
C. Discriminatory interference with Third-Party Contracts 
 
This section of the article analyzes the issue of racial discrimination as 
a blocking mechanism to the creation of contractual relationships. 
Specifically, this section examines factual scenarios in which a defendant 
discriminatorily interferes with a plaintiff’s ability to obtain contracts with 
third parties. 
 
1.  Union Context 
 
In Daniels v. Pipefitters' Ass'n Local Union No. 597,
98
 the defendant 
union, Local Union No. 597, operated a job referral service pursuant to a 
collective bargaining agreement. Even though the job referral system was a 
significant source of jobs for union members, the Local deprived Daniels, 
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an African-American member of the Local, of referral opportunities.
99
 As a 
result, he alleged that the union racially discriminated against its African-
American members in making referrals, violating of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 
In district court, Daniels produced evidence showing not only that 
Local 597 had a long history of discriminatory policies but also that the 
referral system itself violated Section 1981. First, he showed that the agents 
of Local 597 who were responsible for giving out work to union members 
maintained a blacklist that included the names of many African-American 
union members.
100
 To hide their actions, those agents gave out work 
assignments to white union members through back door phone calls and 
meetings.
101
 Second, Daniels introduced expert testimony demonstrating 
that black members of Local 597 received fewer job referrals than they 
should relative to their population.
102
 Third, a fellow African American 
union member testified that the agents of the union once told him that a 
contractor had no need for Local 597 workers, but when he and six fellow 
members showed up to the construction site, they were immediately 
hired.
103
 Fourth, Daniels testified that he witnessed the agents of the union 
making discriminatory referrals in plain sight.
104
 While he stood around 
waiting for an assignment, he heard union agents giving out referrals over 
the telephone and observed favored (white) union members going into the 
back room to receive referrals.
105
 Finally, he showed that Local 597 
actively obstructed him from obtaining employment at a construction job 
by refusing to submit a pro forma letter of recommendation.
106
 Because 
Daniels did not have the letter, the employer required him to undergo 
aptitude testing.
107
 Based on the defendants conduct, Daniels argued, inter 
alia, that the defendant interfered with his right to contract with third 
parties through improperly discriminating against him on the basis of his 
race. The district court concluded that Local 597's job referral service was 
the primary mechanism through which contractors hired union employees; 
accordingly, the court held that “[i]n essence, no referral meant no job and 
no opportunity for union members to enter into employment contracts with 
employers.”108   
The union appealed from a jury verdict in Daniels' favor, arguing that it 
did not interfere with Daniels' right to make contracts because its “referral 
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service was nothing more than a mechanism to encourage union members 
to find employment.”109 Additionally, the union argued that “[o]bstructing 
someone's right to contract with others is . . . unactionable under [Section] 
1981.”110 The Seventh Circuit rejected both of these arguments and 
reasoned that: 
 
This kind of race-based impediment to contract formation 
constitutes exactly the sort of racially discriminatory 
interference with the right to contract that remains actionable 
under § 1981. To hold otherwise would impose a sort of § 1981 
privity of contract requirement that would effectively protect 
third parties such as labor unions from § 1981 liability . . . . 
Local 597 is not an unrelated third party whose interference 
with the contract bears an attenuated or haphazard connection to 
contracting between its members and the employer. On the 
contrary, Local 597 is the necessary intermediary and conduit 
connecting job opportunities to job referrals.
111
 
 
Accordingly, the court held that the union violated Section 1981 when it 
intentionally deprived Daniels of his ability to enter into contracts with 
employers.
112
 
 
2. Other Contexts 
 
The following cases do not involve union conduct but could be used, 
by analogy, to aid minority business owners who feel they have been 
aggrieved by discriminatory union conduct. 
In Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hospital,
113
 the plaintiff, Vakharia, 
was an anesthesiologist who alleged that the defendant hospital violated 42 
U.S.C. § 1981 when it interfered with her ability to contract with patients. 
The hospital maintained a system where anesthesiologists were the sole 
mechanism to obtain patients was through assignment by the hospital and 
referrals by staff surgeons.
114
 During a two-year period, the hospital 
reduced the quantity and quality of Vakharia’s caseload, removed her from 
a “first call” schedule, baselessly classified her as a junior anesthesiologist 
(which confined her to a limited number of relatively simple types of 
procedures), and ultimately suspended her.
115
 She argued that these actions 
interfered with her ability to make contracts with prospective patients and 
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were taken because of her color, race, national origin, age, and sex in 
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Section 1981 of 
the 1866 Civil Rights Act.
116
 The court acknowledged that Section 1981 
prohibits “discriminatory interference by a third party with the exercise of 
the right to make contracts.”117 The court concluded that the alleged 
interferences (e.g., limiting the number of patients) “all seem to fall easily 
within the rubric of proscribed conduct” and allowed Vakharia's § 1981 
claim to proceed past a motion to dismiss.
118
 
In Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon,
119
 the defendant newspaper ran two 
stories about Phelps, a local white attorney who often represented black 
clients. The articles discussed Phelps’ tendency to bring lawsuits shortly 
after alleged incidents and settling them for a fraction of the amount 
sought. Critics of Phelps were quoted in the article as stating that he 
brought “strike suits” for “nuisance value.”120 Subsequently, Phelps sued 
the newspaper, alleging that the story (which Phelps viewed as hostile) 
“interfered with his ‘prospective business opportunities’” in violation of 
Section 1981.
121
 The district court dismissed the claim noting that the 
plaintiff did not allege that he was deprived of an interest protected by 
Section 1981.
122
 The Tenth Circuit affirmed and emphasized that the 
plaintiff did not allege any specific losses, noting that the cases supporting 
the plaintiff’s theory all involved the actual loss of employment or other 
contract interests.
123
 The Tenth Circuit held that vague and conclusory 
allegations are insufficient to state a deprivation of the right to make and 
enforce contracts under Section 1981.
124
 It noted that the plaintiff had the 
same right as others to enter into contracts with those who wish to contract 
with him.
125
 Furthermore, the court articulated that even if the newspaper 
defamed him and, thus, arguably made him less attractive to some who 
otherwise might want to contract with him, the defamation does not deny 
him the basic right to contract.
126
   
In Morrison v. American Board of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc.,
127
 
Morrison, an African American female, sued the American Board of 
Psychiatry and Neurology (“The Board”) under Section 1981 alleging that 
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the Board discriminated against her on racial grounds by denying her 
certification in psychiatry. In its defense, the Board contended that it 
constructed, administered, and evaluated the only examinations for board 
certification in psychiatry in the United States. Accordingly, they 
controlled a psychiatrist's eligibility for employment and staff privileges at 
many hospitals and other health organizations.
128
    
After failing both parts of the oral examination on her first try, in April 
1993, Morrison passed the live patient portion of the exam, but failed the 
video portion.
129
 Both of the examiners for that video portion were white 
males. Another candidate for certification, a white female, made the same 
differential and incorrect diagnosis in the video portion as Morrison. She 
received board certification while Morrison did not.
130
   
Morrison claimed that the Board discriminated against her on race-
based grounds throughout her entire attempt to become board certified. 
First, she claimed that because the Board required her to submit a 
photograph prior to the examination (and thus see that she was an African 
American female), they were able to assign her to a more difficult 
examination facility, biased examiners, and more difficult patient 
profiles.
131
 Second, she claimed that the Board failed her while passing a 
similarly-situated white applicant (the psychiatrist who made the same 
diagnosis).
132
 Finally, she claimed that the Board’s use of a subjective 
evaluation system facilitated racial biases into the examination.
133
 
Morrison alleged that certification “is a large, if not the primary factor 
which patients consider and many hospitals require in choosing or hiring a 
physician.”134 Accordingly, she claimed her denial of certification 
discriminatorily interfered with her right to make contracts with 
prospective clients under Section 1981.
135
 Specifically, she alleged that 
because of the Board’s discriminatory conduct: 1) she would not be 
considered for employment in large hospitals and HMO’s that require 
psychiatrists to be board certified; 2) her current salary is lower than it 
would have been if she was certified; and 3) her expertise will be called 
into question from future employers and potential patients.
136
 The Board 
argued that these allegations were insufficient because “Morrison ha[d] not 
alleged that the Board ha[d] interfered with her efforts to make a specific 
contract, as contrasted with assertions of ‘lost economic opportunities' that 
are too speculative to be recognized under Section 1981” and because the 
“Board [did] not have the kind of ‘active control’ over Morrison's ability to 
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contract that is needed to call Section 1981 into play.”137   
The court rejected these arguments and upheld Morrison's right to 
proceed:  “Morrison has alleged more than abstract or pie-in-the-sky lost 
economic opportunities. She says expressly that without Board certification 
she will suffer the identifiable harm of being unable to contract with the 
many medical facilities that require Board certification.”138 The court 
distinguished Phelps as involving a “speculative assertion” that “contrasts 
sharply with the Morrison allegations that . . . many medical facilities and 
private patients make Board certification a prerequisite to employment.”139 
Citing Daniels, the Board countered that it did not have the same ability as 
the unions job referral service that was described as a necessary 
intermediary. Instead, the Board argued that it is an “unrelated third party 
whose interference with the contract bears an attenuated or haphazard 
connection to contracting between Morrison and future employers.”140 The 
court dismissed that argument and emphasized that, for the purposes of rule 
12(b)(6), Morrison’s allegations were sufficiently specific at the current 
stage of litigation.
141
 
In Shirkey v. Eastwind Community Development Corp.,
142
 a church 
affiliated nonprofit organization denied Shirkey, a white minister,  the 
position of community developer. He challenged his non-hiring under 
Section 1981 against three defendants, the National Division of the General 
Board of Global Ministries of the United Methodist Church (“National”), 
the Baltimore-Washington Conference of the United Methodist Church 
(“Conference”), and the Eastwind Community Development Corporation 
(“Eastwind”).143 During his time as a minister, Shirkey’s community 
development work helped create Eastwind, a non-profit corporation whose 
goal was to promote economic development and quality of life in East 
Baltimore. The community served by that project was predominately 
African-American.
144
 Fifty percent of Eastwind's Board of Directors were 
members of the Methodist church, while the other fifty percent were 
residents of the surrounding community.
145
 After Eastwind's founding in 
1990, it sought funding for a community developer position from National 
through a program known as the “Community Developer's Program.”146 
Eastwind received funding by completing a written application for the 
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project, having it approved by the Conference, and finally submitting it to 
National's office of community developers. In April of 1991, Shirkey 
approached a board member of Eastwind and expressed interest in applying 
for the position of community developer. The board member told Shirkey 
that he could not apply for the position of community developer because 
National required the position to be filled by an African-American as a 
condition for their funding. As a result, Shirkey was not considered for the 
position, and Eastwind ultimately hired an African-American. In response, 
Shirkey brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging that he was 
denied the opportunity to apply for the community development position 
with Eastwind due to racially restrictive criteria developed by National, 
approved by the Conference, and implemented by Eastwind.
147
 
National argued that it is not an appropriate defendant under Section 
1981 because Shirkey and National did not share an employer/employee 
relationship.
148
 Citing Daniels and Vakharia, the court rejected this 
argument and emphasized that Section 1981 has been applied where there 
is no direct employer/employee relationship.
149
 The court noted that as long 
as the discriminating entity interfered with the plaintiff's ability to enter 
into an employment contract on the basis of race, an employer/employee 
relationship was not required.
150
 While Eastwind and National were 
different corporate entities, the policy at issue in this case was directly 
attributed to National; therefore, the court concluded that National's 
liability was not predicated on any employer/employee relationship but, 
rather, hinged on whether or not National intentionally impeded Shirkey's 
ability to apply for the community developer position.
151
 Based on the 
evidence, the court held that National could not credibly claim an 
attenuated relationship between Eastwind's implementation of the 
community developers program and National’s policies.152 
In Harris v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
153
 the plaintiff Orlando Harris, an African 
American man, owned “SPI,” a business that repaired smoke, fire, and 
water damage to property in Oklahoma City. Defendant, Allstate, was an 
insurer who had a program for referring its insured to approved vendors for 
repair services.
154
 When one of Allstate's insured’s needed an emergency 
repair service, Allstate would allow the insured to choose from a list of 
vendors who provided that service. According to SPI, the insured rarely 
had a preference. In that circumstance, Allstate would choose the vendor.
155
 
SPI was on Allstate’s list, but allegedly received a disproportionately low 
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number of the referrals.
156
 Harris alleged, inter alia, that Allstate violated 
Section 1981 when it failed to administer its referral program free of racial 
bias and that Allstate's discriminatory refusal to give referrals to SPI 
precluded SPI from forming contracts with Allstate’s insured.157 
The Tenth Circuit compared the decisions in Phelps, Daniels, 
Vakharia, Morrison, and Shirkey to the facts present in this case.
158
 The 
court noted that in Daniels, the union's job referral service was described as 
the “necessary intermediary and conduit connecting job opportunities to job 
referrals.”159 In this case, however, SPI presented no evidence that 
placement on AllState’s list was a necessary requirement for SPI to enter 
into contracts with Allstate's customers. As such, the court found that 
Daniels, Morrison, and Vakharia were distinguishable because, unlike 
Allstate, the defendants in those cases were actually in a position to 
interfere with the plaintiff’s ability to make third party contracts.160 The 
court articulated that relief is available under Section 1981 when a plaintiff 
demonstrates that the interfering party discriminatorily uses its authority to 
preclude the business from securing a contract with a third party and that it 
“both possessed sufficient authority to significantly interfere with the 
individual's ability to obtain contracts with third parties, and that the party 
actually exercised that authority to the individuals detriment.”161 The court 
held that the plaintiff's claim did not meet either of those requirements 
because the complaint alleged that he did not receive the benefit of insurer's 
referrals (as opposed to the insurer exercising its authority to the plaintiff's 
detriment).
162
 Additionally, the court held that the defendant did not 
possess sufficient authority to significantly interfere with the plaintiff's 
ability to obtain contracts with third parties because being on the referral 
list was not a necessary requirement for the plaintiff to enter into contracts 
with Allstate's insured.
163
 
In Ginx, Inc. v. Soho Alliance,
164
 the plaintiff was an African American 
business-woman who owned a restaurant called Lolas. For nineteen years, 
Lolas operated out of one location in Manhattan; however, in 2008, it lost 
its lease and attempted to move to Soho.
165
 Subsequently, the plaintiff 
picked out a location in Soho, signed a lease, and applied for a liquor 
license. Shortly thereafter, twenty-two community groups, including the 
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defendants, challenged Lolas’ application to serve liquor.166 After 
reviewing the evidence presented in opposition to the application, including 
unanimous opposition by public officials (community board members and a 
state senator, assemblyperson and councilmember), the testimony of a 
traffic expert, and photos of traffic jams along Watts Street (the street 
where Lola’s would operate), the board in charge of approving the license 
denied Lola’s application.167 Plaintiff alleged that defendants 
discriminatorily interfered with their right to contract with future customers 
when they challenged Lolas’ license application.168 Under the Harris 
framework, the court held that the defendants did not interfere with the 
plaintiff's right to contract under Section 1981 because the defendants did 
not have the power make the decisions that would interfere with the 
plaintiff's ability to contract (only a court of law could have that power).
169
 
Additionally, the court emphasized that a party must allege and identify 
particular and specific business opportunities that were lost due to 
discriminatory interference by a third-party before a claim for third-party 
interference can be brought.
170
 Accordingly, the court dismissed the 
plaintiff’s Section 1981 claim because the plaintiffs failed to identify any 
specific contracts that the defendant's alleged interference prevented them 
from entering.
171
 
 
IV. ANALYSIS 
 
The Kia and Painters Union’s decisions suggest that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 
can be applied to a broad spectrum of union behavior. While the plaintiff 
did not succeed in either case, both decisions indicate that minority owned 
businesses have relief when labor unions apply contractual provisions of 
collective bargaining agreements or union policies in a discriminatory 
manner. In Painters Union, the court ruled in favor of the defendant union 
because (1) the union had a legitimate reason to audit the plaintiff’s books 
(it received employee complaints), and (2) it did not receive employee 
complaints from similarly situated white owned businesses.
172
 Similarly, in 
Kia, the court held that the union’s conduct (such as the ordering of audits) 
toward minority owned businesses were entirely consistent with lawful 
actions by the union to collect unpaid CBA payments.
173
 In both cases, the 
minority business owner failed because of insufficient evidence. The 
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implication is that with sufficient evidence, a minority owned business 
would have a viable claim under Section 1981 against a labor union. 
Accordingly, if the union in Painters Union had not received employee 
complaints and still audited the minority owned business, or if the union 
received employee complaints from white owned businesses and did not 
proceed with an audit, the plaintiff would have had a much greater chance 
at success. Similarly, if the minority business owner in Kia had alleged that 
the union was treating white owned businesses differently, the result may 
have been more favorable to the plaintiff. 
Returning to the hypothetical presented in the background section of 
the Article (a union discriminatorily refusing to supply a letter of good 
standing to a shipping company because its owner is African American),
174
 
the owner would succeed on his claim if he brought evidence that: 1) the 
union did not have a legitimate reason to deny him the letter, and 2) other 
similarly situated white owned businesses received letters. Alternatively, 
the minority business owner would likely succeed on his claim if he 
brought evidence that: 1) the union did have a legitimate reason to deny 
him the letter, or 2) they did not enforce the policy behind the denial 
against similarly situated white owned businesses. The framework of this 
analysis in practice would be similar to the test articulated by the Seventh 
Circuit in Elkhatib.
175
 
While Elkhatib involved a franchise agreement and not a collective 
bargaining agreement, the case is still instructive for several significant 
reasons. Indeed, the facts are analogous because the minority-business 
owner of the Dunkin Donuts franchise would replace the hypothetical 
shipping company owner in the analysis. Likewise, corporate Dunkin 
Donuts replaces the union in the analysis because it discriminatorily 
applied the terms of a standard (franchise) agreement to a minority-owned 
business when it terminated the company’s agreement because the owner 
refused to carry pork products. In addition to being factually analogous, the 
case was significant because it was decided at the summary judgment 
phase, rather than on a motion to dismiss.
176
 In Elkhatib, unlike in Kia and 
Painters Union, the plaintiff produced evidence that Dunkin Donuts 
allowed similarly situated white-owned franchises to carry less than the full 
breakfast line. Accordingly, the Elkhatib court found that there was 
sufficient evidence for a jury to find pretext.    
 Under the Elkhatib framework, the hypothetical shipping-company 
owner would have to produce evidence that: (1) he belonged to a protected 
class; (2) he met the labor union’s legitimate expectations with regard to 
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the collective bargaining agreement; (3) he suffered an adverse action; and 
(4) similarly-situated non-protected white business owners were treated 
more favorably.
177
 Subsequent to such a showing, the traditional 
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting process would control.
178
 
Unlike the cause of action for discriminatory application of contractual 
provisions, plaintiffs have succeeded against unions under Section 1981 for 
discriminatory interference with third party contracts. While Daniels 
involved an individual member of a union and was decided early in the 
evolution of this cause of action, nothing subsequent has been decided that 
would prevent it from being used in the minority business owner-union 
context.   
Returning to the hypothetical shipping company owner, the Harris 
framework would be applied in the following way: the hypothetical 
plaintiff would have relief under Section 1981 if he demonstrated that the 
union possessed 1) sufficient authority to significantly interfere with the 
ability of his shipping company to obtain contracts with third parties and 2) 
that the Union actually exercised that authority to the individuals detriment. 
Similar to the psychiatrist in Valkharia who needed board certification to 
practice psychiatry, if the owner of the trucking company showed that the 
letter of good standing was a requirement to be hired by outside 
contractors, he would meet the first prong of this framework. After meeting 
that burden, like the plaintiff in Daniels and unlike the plaintiff in Ginx, the 
owner of the trucking company would need to allege specific contracts that 
were lost as a result of the interference by the union. 
A review of the case history suggests that a minority owned business is 
more likely to succeed on a claim that the contractual provisions of a 
collective bargaining agreement are being applied in a discriminatory 
manner than on a claim that a labor union’s conduct is discriminatorily 
interfering with the minority owned business’ contracts. While the 
individual plaintiff in Daniels succeeded on his claim, to date no case law 
exists where a minority-owned business has brought a discriminatory 
interference with contract claim against a union. Indeed, other than the 
guidance provided by Daniels and the cases under different factual 
circumstances, a minority business owner has sparse legal authority to 
bring his or her claim under this cause of action. Conversely, a minority 
business owner has stronger legal footing to bring a discriminatory 
application of contractual provisions claim based on the decisions in Kia, 
Painters Union and Elkahatib.   
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose and intent of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 was to eradicate racial 
discrimination. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Runyon made it clear that 
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remedies should be available to private acts of discrimination. Allowing 
unions to discriminate against minority owned business by applying the 
terms of collective bargaining agreements in a discriminatory manner or by 
interfering with a minority owned business’ ability to contract with third 
parties is repugnant to the meaning and intent of Section 1981. Thus, these 
two causes of action should provide relief to minority business owners who 
find themselves being discriminated against by labor unions. 
 
